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LEGAL POSSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL RAILROAD
INCORPORATION
Eighty-four per cent of the railroads are knocking at the
doors of Congress for federal charters. Chambers of Commerce,
Boards of Trade, and other business organizations are steadily
supporting the application. On the other hand ch-. State Com-
missions are vigorously opposing. One of the questions pro-
pounded by the Joint Committee of the Senate and House on
the railroad problem is on this subject.'
The railroads seem to have the better of the argument. They
submit that regulation by nearly forty conflicting, duplicating,
and overlapping commissions is intolerable, and that there should
be but one.2  They claim that the Union was formed largely to
1 Circular of Joint Committee of Senate and House (Nov. 1916):
whether any national legislation is required as to the organiza-
tion of carriers in interstate commerce in the nature of national incorpora-
tion, permissive or compulsory, or in the nature of national holding
companies under which State corporations may be controlled and unified
in their operations in the interest of interstate commerce, and what form
of national legislation for the incorporation of carriers or for holding
companies owning the stock of State companies, is desirable. How will
national incorporation affect the police powers of the States over railroads
operating within their boundaries? Will it be advisable, as in the case
of the national banks, for the National Government to prescribe a uniform
rule for the taxation by the States of railroad properties and securities ?"
2 Senator Underwood, in an address delivered Feb. 4, I916, said: "We
must consider the wisdom of substituting one master for the forty-nine
masters that regulate our commerce to-day."
Howard Elliott, in an address Feb. 8, 1916, said: "To-day the carriers
of interstate commerce are the servants of forty-nine masters, of con-
flicting powers and desires, and if it be true that no man can successfully
serve two masters, how confusing and inefficient must be the mental state
of him who must serve the United States and a number of sovereign
States."
The Republican national platform in the presidential campaign of 1916
contained the following plank: "Interstate and intrastate transportation
have become so interwoven that the attempt to apply the two, and often
several, sets of laws to its regulation has produced conflicts of authority,
embarrassment in operation and inconvenience and expense to the public.
The entire transportation system of the country has become essentially
national. We, therefore, favor such action by legislation, or, if necessary,
through an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as will
result in placing it under exclusive Federal control."
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protect interstate commerce; that it is the duty of Congress to
provide the protection; and that the only way to give it is by
federal charters." They say that they cannot furnish proper
3 On this subject Mr. Thorn, the General Counsel of the Southern Rail-
way, at a hearing before the House Interstate Commerce Committee in
Washington on Feb. 29, i916, quoted John Fiske, The Critical Period of
American History, pp. 171-75, as follows:
"Meanwhile the different States, with their different tariff and tonnage
acts, began to make commercial war upon one another. No sooner had
the other three New England States virtually closed their ports to British
shipping than Connecticut threw hers wide open, an act which she fol-
lowed up by laying duties upon imports from Massachusetts.
"Pennsylvania discriminated against Delaware, and New Jersey, pil-
laged at once by both her great neighbors, was compared to a cask
tapped at both ends. The conduct of New York became especially selfish
and blameworthy. That rapid growth which was so soon to carry the
city and state to the position of primacy in the Union had already begun.
After the departure of the British the revival of business went on with
leaps and bounds. The feeling of local patriotism waxed strong, and in
no one was it more completely manifested than in George Clinton, the
Revolutionary general, whom the people elected governor for six succes-
sive terms. . . . It was his first article of faith that New York must
be the greatest State in the Union. But his conceptions of statesmanship
were extremely narrow. In his mind the welfare of New York meant the
pulling down and thrusting aside of all her neighbors and rivals. . .
Under his guidance, the history of New York, during the five years fol-
lowing the peace of 1783, was a shameful story of greedy monopoly and
sectional hate ...
"A single instance which occurred early in 1787, may serve as an
illustration. The city of New York, with its population of 3oooo souls,
had long been supplied with firewood from Connecticut and with its
butter and cheese, chickens and garden vegetables from the thrifty farms
of New Jersey. This trade, it was observed, carried thousands of dollars
out of the city and into the pockets of detested Yankees and despised
Jerseymen. It was ruinous to domestic industry said the men of New
York. It must be stopped by those effective remedies of the Sangrado
school of economic doctors, a navigation act and a protective tariff. Acts
were accordingly passed, obliging every Yankee sloop which came down
through Hell Gate, and every Jersey market boat which was rowed across
from Paulus Hook to Cortlandt Street, to pay entrance fees and obtain
clearances at the custom house, just as was done by ships from London
or Hamburg; and not a cartload of Connecticut firewood could be de-
livered at the back door of a country house in Beekman Street until
it should have paid a heavy duty. Great and just was the wrath of the
farmers and lumbermen. The New Jersey Legislature made up its mind
to retaliate. . . . Connecticut was equally prompt. At a great meeting
of business men, held at New London, it was unanimously agreed to sus-
pend all commercial intercourse with New York. Every merchant signed
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transportation without strong financial support, which is practi-
cally impossible under present commission rule.
Ever since the formation of our government the tendency has
been towards centralization of power at Washington. Assuming
then that federal charters will be granted the question arises:
What will be their legal status? And more important still,
How can those charters be framed to carry out the public will?
It is no longer doubted that Congress has the power to grant
federal charters to railroads engaged in interstate commerce.
Several such charters were granted in the sixties to encourage
railroad building to the Pacific coast.4  The Supreme Court
holds that a federal railroad charter is legal as a means of
regulating interstate commerce and establishing post roads.
5
an agreement, under penalty of $25o. for the first offense, not to send any
goods whatever into the hated State for a period of twelve months. By
such retaliatory measures, it was hoped that New York might be com-
pelled to rescind her odious enactment. But such meetings and such
resolves bore an ominous likeness to the meetings and resolves which in
the years before 1775 had herald a state of war; and but for the
good work done by the federal convention another five years would
scarcely have elapsed before shots would have been fired and seeds of
perennial hatred sown on the shores that look toward Manhattan Island."
The Supreme Court of the United States in the Shreveport case (1914)
234 U. S. 342, 360, a few months ago said: "It was recognized at the
beginning that the nation could not prosper if interstate and foreign trade
were governed by many masters."
4 The first one was that of the Union Pacific granted July I, 1862, 12
U. S. St 489. In 1864 Congress chartered the Northern Pacific R. R. Co.
and authorized to build a railway line from a point in Minnesota or
Wisconsin to Puget Sound. 13 U. S. St. 365. In 1866 Congress chartered
the Atlantic & Pacific R. R. Co. to construct a railroad from a point
in Missouri to the Pacific Ocean. 14 U. S. St. 292. In 1871 Congress
chartered the Texas Pacific Railroad to construct a railroad in California
and Texas. I6 U. S. St. 573.
5 Califoria v. Pacific R. R. (i888) 127 U. S. I, 39. The court in refer-
ring to the above Acts of Congress said: "It cannot at the present day
be doubted that congress, under the power to rigulate commerce among
the several states as well as to provide for postal accommodations and
military exigencies, had authority to pass these laws. The power to con-
struct or to authorize individuals or corporations to construct national
highways and bridges from state to state is essential to the complete
control and regulation of interstate commerce." See also Mercantile T.
Co. v. Texas, etc. Ry. (1914) 216 Fed. 225 Congress may create a cor-
poration to build a bridge across navigable waters between two states.
Luxton, etc. v. North River Bridge Co. (1894) 153 U. S. 525.
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Congress at various times has granted various kinds of federal
charters and its power in that respect is no longer doubted.6
This brings us to a more difficult question. May not Congress
curb state interference with railroads by greater congressional
regulation, without federal incorporation? Will not the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court and the rulings of the Interstate
Commerce Commission suffice? The Shreveport decision, hold-
ing that a state cannot unreasonably reduce intrastate railroad
rates to eliminate interstate competition, i. e., interstate com-
merce, is pointed to as proof that the courts can work out the
problem.7
The objection is that judicial control inevitably entails inter-
minable delay and inextricable confusion. Most astonishing
decisions, defining what is intrastate commerce as distinguished
from interstate commerce, are being handed down in state and
federal courts. One of the very latest is by the Supreme Court
of Missouri, adopting the reasoning of an article published in
1914;8 namely, that interstate commerce, requiring a general
system or uniformity of regulation, is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of Congress, whether exercised or not; but as to
subjects which, owing to local conditions, may also be regulated
by state regulation, the jurisdiction of Congress is exclusive only
6 The power of Congress to incorporate a bank was contested but the
Supreme Court sustained it. McCulloch v. Maryland (I819) 4 Wheat.
(U. S.) 316. In 1791 the first Congress incorporated the first Bank of the
United States. I U. S. St. I9I. The charter expired and in 1815 Congress
passed a new charter, but the President vetoed it. Annals of Congress,
13th Congress, Vol. 3, p. 2o8. In 1816 Congress incorporated the second
Bank of the United States. 3 U. S. St. 266. In 1863 Congress passed
a general statute for the incorporation of national banks. 12 U. S. St.
665. The present Federal Reserve Act was enacted in 1913. 38 U. S.
St. 251. In 1865 Congress incorporated the Freedmans Savings & Trust
Co. I3 U. S. St. 510; in i865 the National Asylum for Disabled Soldiers,
13 U. S. St. 5o9; in 1872 the Centennial Board of Finance, 17 U. S.
St. 203; in I889 the Maritime Canal Company of Nicaragua, 25 U. S.
St. 673. Congress has created corporations within the District of Colum-
bia; for instance, in 1876 a corporation to do an insurance business in
that District. 19 U. S. St. 38o. Congress in the case of the Cumberland or
National Road, from the Potomac across the Alleghenies to the Ohio,
authorized the construction of a public highway connecting several states.
See Indiana v. United States (1893) 148 U. S. 148.
7 Houston, etc. Ry. v. United States (1914) 234 U. S. 342.
s 28 HARv. L. REV. 34.
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when exercised.9 But how many years would it take to work
out the application of that rule to thousands of diversified situa-
tions, to which it would apply throughout this vast country.
Then, there is the rule that a railroad shipment from one point
in a state to a point in the same state, but passing in transit
through another state, is not interstate commerce in tax matters,
0
but is interstate commerce as to the Interstate -Commerce Act."
A shipper's claim to be reimbursed for expense for placing inside
doors on cars on an interstate shipment may be sustained as to
intrastate shipments under the New York statute,
2 but not in
the federal courts as to interstate shipments until after the Inter-
state Commerce Commission has passed upon the matter.
3
Another decision of the Supreme -Court is that a shipment over
an intrastate railroad may be interstate commerce and subject to
the Interstate Commerce Act where there is a connecting line
agreement for through carriage,' and the later Galveston Ter-
minal decision is that the Terminal Company was in fact and
in law a part of the railroad system of the Southern Pacific
Company, and, hence, subject to the Interstate Commerce Act.'
5
Still another decision declares that corn shipped from South
Dakota to Texarkana, Texas, is intrastate traffic as to Texas, it
appearing that the corn on arriving at Texarkana was trans-
ferred to the connecting railroad for further transportation to
another Texas point on a separate bill of lading.' On the other
hand, where coal is shipped from a mine in Ohio to an Ohio lake
port and there loaded upon a boat to be sent to other states; the
Ohio State Commission has no jurisdiction over such shipment.'
7
9Lusk v. Atkinson (-1gi6) 186 S. W. (Mo.) 703.
10 Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Pennsylvania (1892) 145 U. S. 192
"1 United States v. D. L. & W. R. Co. (19o7) 152 Fed. 269; Milk Pro-
ducers Co. v. D. L. & W. R. Co. (1897) 7 I. C. C. Rep. 92; New Orleans
Cotton Exchange v. Cincinnati, etc. Ry. (1888) 2 I. C. C. Rep. 375; Hanley
v. Kansas City Southern Ry. (19o3) 187 U. S. 617.
12 Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. R. (1913) 208 N. Y. 312.
'3 Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R. R. (16) 240 U. S. 43.
14 Cincinnati, etc. Ry. v. Interstate C. C. (1896) 162 U. S. 184. A similar
decision is that of Baer, etc. Co. v. Denver & R. G. R. R. (1914) 233
U. S. 479.
'15 Southern Pacific, etc. Co. v. Interstate C. C. (911) 229 U. S. 498.
18 Gulf, Col. & Santa Fe, etc. v. Texas (1907) 204 U. S. 403.
17 Railroad Commission of Ohio v. Worthington Receivers (1912) 225
U. S. 10I.
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The courts have travelled far along the lines which were avoided
by the Supreme 'Court of the United States over sixty years ago,
when it was argued that a purely intrastate act of transportation
might become interstate if it was one of a series of acts and
transactions which were interstate. The court held that this was
not the law.'
8
Judge Cooley in his work on Constitutional Limitations says :19
"The line of distinction between that which constitutes
an interference with commerce, and that which is a
mere police regulation, is sometimes exceedingly dim and
shadowy, and it is not to be wondered at that learned
jurists differ when endeavoring to classify the cases which
arise."
The boundary line between intrastate commerce and interstate
commerce is shadowy and wavering, fluctuating from time to
time in response to politics and trade necessities. It has been a
legal and political issue for two generations. It would be hazard-
ous for anyone to assert that Congress may eliminate it altogether
merely by Act of Congress, or that courts will eliminate it by
decisions. Even if they should attempt it, there would be doubt,
confusion, delay, and interminable litigation.
Fifty years have not sufficed to work out a remedy for trans-
portation ailments. Meantime the patient is dying. The rail-
roads have got to have money to keep up with the growth of the
nation in population and commerce, but money they cannot get.
18 Veazie v. Moor (1852) 14 How. (U. S.) 568, 574. The court said:
"A pretension as far reaching as this would extend to contracts between
citizen and citizen of the same state, would control the pursuits of the
planter, the grazier, the manufacturer, the mechanic, the immense opera-
tions of the collieries, and mines and furnaces of the country; for there
is not one of these avocations the results of which may not become the
subjects of foreign commerce,-and be borne, either by turnpikes, canals,
or railroads from point to point within the several states, towards an
ultimate destination like the one above mentioned. Such a pretension
would effectually prevent or paralyze every effort at internal improvement
by the several states; for it cannot be supposed that the states would
exhaust their capital and their credit in the construction of turnpikes,
canals and railroads, the remuneration derivable from which, and all
control over which, might be immediately wrested from them, because
such public works would be facilities for commerce which, whilst avail-
ing itself of those facilities, was unquestionably internal, although inter-
mediately or ultimately it might become foreign."
19 P. 586.
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The investor is afraid of regulation. This is the crux of the
trouble. Mr. Prouty, the veteran Interstate Commerce Com-
missioner, says:
"This is the point at which regulation will break down
if at all. Can private capital be induced, under the treat-
ment which is accorded that capital by the regulating body,
to invest? If Government ownership ever comes in the
United States it will probably be because private capital
cannot be obtained in sufficient amounts to afford an
adequate service."
Like the government, the railroads are always passing the hat.
If they cannot get the money the public will suffer and then will
come government ownership as a dernier resort. In other words,
state interference with the railroads must be stopped by some
more summary remedy than courts and commissions. The de-
cisions are a bewildering mass of fine distinctions, a labyrinth
of inconsistent and contradictory rulings, and no one knows
what will come next. It is a Gordian knot. Is there no way
of cutting it?
There certainly is. Federal incorporation. A federal railroad
charter could expressly forbid state regulation of intrastate rates
and in fact forbid any state regulation of the railroads owned
by such federal railroad corporations. This would be constitu-
tional. The underlying reason of the complete power of Con-
gress over railroads owned by federal railroad corporations is
plain. Congress in creating a corporation has, and may retain,
full power over its own creation as to its property, rates, elections
and practices, its bond issues and its stock issues. Congress
could exercise that power as it pleased from time to time. Only
a few months ago the Supreme -Court, in describing a federal
railroad charter,20 quoted from one of its earlier decisions as
follows:
"The charter of incorporation not only creates it [the
corporation] but gives it every faculty which it possesses.
The power to acquire rights of any description, to
transact business of any description, to make con-
tracts of any description, to sue on those contracts, is
given and measured by its charter, and that charter is a
law of the United States. This being can acquire no
right, make no contract, bring no suit, which is not author-
20 Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas & Pac. Ry. (1916) 241 U. S. 295, 305.
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ized by a law of the United States. It is not only itself
the mere creature of a law, but all its actions and all its
rights are dependent on the same law. Can a being, thus
constituted, have a case which does not arise literally, as
well as substantially, under the law? Take the case of a
contract, which is put as the strongest against the bank
. ... The act of Congress is its foundation. The con-
tract could never have been made but under the authority
of that act. The act itself is the first ingredient in the
case, 'is its origin, is that from which every other part
arises. The other questions may also arise, as the execu-
tion of the contract, or its performance, cannot change the
case, or give it any other origin than the charter of incor-
poration. The action still originates in, and is sustained
by, that charter."
There are only a few decisions on the power of Congress to
forbid a state regulating the intrastate rates of a federal railroad
company but they point the way very clearly. In 1894 the
Supreme Court held that Texas might regulate the intrastate
rates of the Texas and Pacific Railway Company, a federal
railroad corporation, but this was because -Congress had not
prohbited it.
2 1
21 Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S. 413, 416. The court
said: "Similarly we think it may be said that, conceding to Congress the
power to remove the corporation in all its operations from the control of
the State, there is in the act creating this company nothing which indicates
an intent on the part of Congress to so remove it, and there is nothing in
the enforcement by the State of reasonable rates for transportation wholly
within the State which will disable the corporation from discharging all
the duties and exercising all the powers conferred by Congress. By the
act of incorporation Congress authorized the company to build its road
through 'the State of Texas. It knew that, when constructed, a part of
its business would be the carrying of persons and property from points
within the State to other points also within the State, and that in so
doing it would be engaged in a business, control of which is nowhere by
the Federal Constitution given to Congress. It must have been known
that, in the nature of things, the control of that business would be
exercised by the State, and if it deemed that the interests of the nation
and the discharge of the duties required on behalf of the nation from this
corporation demanded exemption in all things from state control, it would
unquestionably have expressed such intention in language whose meaning
would be clear. Its silence in this respect is satisfactory assurance that,
in so far as this corporation should engage in business wholly within
the State, it intended that it should be subjected to the ordinary control
exercised by the State over such business. Without, therefore, relying at
all upon any acceptance by the railroad corporation of the act of the
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About six months later in that same year, Mr. Justice Brewer,
sitting at circuit, passed upon the federal charter of the Union
Pacific Railroad Company and held that Nebraska might regulate
the intrastate rates because Congress had not reserved to itself
the sole and absolute control of all rates in granting the federal
charter.
22
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed this view and assumed
that Congress had the power to exercise exclusive control over
intrastate rates of a federal railroad company.
28
legislature of the State, passed in 1873 in respect to it, we are of opinion
that the Texas and Pacific Railway Company is, as to business done
wholly within the State, subject to the control of the State in all matters
of taxation, rates, and other police regulations."
22 Amnes V. Union Pacific Railway Co. (895) 64 Fed. 165. The court
said at p. 170: "It is insisted that the Union Pacific Railway Company
cannot be subjected to the provisions of this statute, because it is a cor-
poration created by congress, and as such, in the discharge of any of its
functions, is subject only to the control of that body. The general ques-
tion of the power of a state in respect to rates for local freight over a
corporation organized under the laws of congress was considered in
Reagan v. Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S. 413, and it was there held that the
mere fact that the corporation was so organized did not exempt it from
state control in that respect. It was conceded in the opinion in that case
that congress could wholly remove such a corporation from state control;
but it was held that, in the absence of something in the statutes indicating
an intention on the part of congress to so remove it, the state had the
power to prescribe the rates for all local business carried by it. Of course,
that decision is controlling."
2aSinythe v. Ames (1898) 169 U. S. 466, 521, 522. The court said:
"It cannot be doubted that the making of rates for transportation by
railroad corporations along public highways, between points wholly
within the limits of a State, is a subject primarily within the control of
that State. And it ought not to be supposed that Congress intended that,
so long as it forbore to establish rates on the Union Pacific Railroad,
the corporation itself could fix such rates for transportation as it saw
proper independently of the right of the States through which the road
was constructed to prescribe regulations for transportation beginning and
ending within their respective limits. On the contrary, the better inter-
pretation of the act of July 1, 1862, is that the question of rates for
wholly local business was left under the control of the respective States
through which the Union Pacific Railroad might pass, with power reserved
to Congress to intervene under certain circumstances and fix the rates
that the corporation could reasonably charge and collect. Congress not
having exerted this power, we do not think that the national character
of the corporation constructing the Union Pacific Railroad stands in the
way of a State prescribing rates for transporting property on that road
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That was in 1898. Three years previously the Supreme Court
touched upon the same question incidentally.24  In 1873 the
Supreme Court held that the railroad property of a federal rail-
road corporation might be taxed by a state, there being nothing
in the charter prohibiting such taxation.
25
Chief Justice Marshall in the McCulloch case in i8i9 laid
down the broad principle governing this subject when he said:
"The sovereignty of a state extends to every thing
which exists 'by its own authority, or is introduced by its
permission; but does it extend to thbse means which are
employed by congress to carry into execution powers con-
ferred on that body by the people of the United States?
We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers
are not given by the people of a single State. They are
given by the people of the United States to a government
wholly between points within its territory. Until Congress, in the exer-
cise either of the power specifically reserved by the eighteenth section of the
act of 1862 or its power under the general reservation made of authority
to add to, alter, amend or repeal that act, prescribes rates to be charged
by the railroad company, it remains with the States through which the
road passes to fix rates for transportation beginning and ending within
their respective limits."
2 4 Southern Pacific R. R. v. California (1895) 162 U. S. 91, 125. The
court said: "Of course, if Congress should think it necessary for the
protection of the United States to declare such property exempted, that
would present a different question."
25 In Railroad Company v. Peniston (1873) 18 Wall. (U. S.) 5, 36 the
court said: "It is therefore, manifest that exemption of Federal agencies
from State taxation is dependent, not upon the nature of the agents, or
upon the mode of their constitution, or upon the fact that they are agents,
but upon the effect of the tax; that is, upon the question whether the
tax does in truth deprive them of power to serve the government as they
were intended to serve it, or does hinder the efficient exercise of their
power." Mr. Justice Swayne concurring therein stated that Congress had
power to prohibit such taxation if Congress saw fit. See also Van Brock-
lin v. State of Tennessee (I886) 117 U. S. 151, 177; Central Pacific R. R.
v. California (1896) 162 U. S. 91, 125. The National Bank Act expressly
authorized the states to tax the land and shares of stock of national
banks. Act of Congress of June 3, 1864, amended Feb. IO, 1868. Cf.
McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316; National Bank v.
Commonwealth (1869) 9 Wall. (U. S.) 353; Owensboro Nat. Bank v.
Owensboro (1899) 173 U. S. 664. This question will be very important
if federal charters are granted to railroad companies, inasmuch as the
states at present derive over $ioooooooo annual revenue from the taxa-
tion of railroad property. It is extremely probable,' however, that Congress
would never prohibit such taxation.
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whose laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, are
declared to be supreme. Consequently, the people of a
single State cannot confer a sovereignty which will extend
over them." 26
A federal railroad charter forbidding any state regulation of
rates, or otherwise, would stop such regulation instantly. One
act of prohibition is worth twenty years of litigation. Moreover,
Congress may be induced to grant such federal railroad charters;
but probably never could be induced to prohibit the states from
regulating intrastate railroad rates on the theory that such
regulation interfered with interstate commerce.
Assuming, then, that federal charters will be granted to unify
regulations and to control issues of stock and bonds, will the
railroad problem be solved thereby? Will that produce the
necessary funds for railroad extensions and improvements?
Decidedly not. Witness the old federal charters. They are
nearly all extinct. Even the Union Pacific was foreclosed in
1897 and only a few weeks ago the Texas Pacific, incorporated
by Congress in 1871, passed into the hands of a receiver. Its
federal charter did not save it.
Here again the law points the way. The old Union Pacific
charter from 'Congress allowed the government to name five
directors.2 7 A new federal charter might legally provide that
the government name all of the directors.2 8  At present the
26 McCulloch v. Maryland (I81g)" 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 316, 429.
27 (1862) 12 U. S. St. 491; (1864) 13 U. S. St. 361.
28 Unless the original federal charters contain such a provision it is
doubtful whether such a provision could be inserted later, even under
the usual reserved right to amend charters. This reserved right to amend
has decided limitations. It does not legalize a fundamental change in a
charter. Cooley, Const. Lint. (5th ed.) p. 454; Close v. Glenwood Ceme-
tery (1882) 107 U. S. 466. It has been held particularly that changing
the voting power of stockholders, after the charter has been granted, is
a fundamental change, even under the reserved power to amend. Lord v.
Equitable etc. Soc. (I9O9) 194 N. Y. 212. It is true that the constitutional
prohibition against violation of 'a contract applies only to the states, but
the constitutional provision as to "due process of law" accomplishes the
same thing as to an Act of Congress. Sinking-Fund Cases (1878) 99
U. S. 7oo. Hence if the public is to name any of the directors under the
proposed federal railroad charters, that provision should be put into the
original charters themselves, or at least the original charter in reserving
power to amend should expressly reserve the power to authorize the
government to name the directors of the federal corporations.
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directors represent nobody except themselves. They do not
represent the public, nor the government, nor the agricultural
interests, nor the manufacturing, nor shipping interests. Strange
to say they do not even represent the stockholders. The stock-
holders no longer attend the meetings and thousands do not even
send in their proxies. They merely take their dividends and
hope for more. They are a negligible quantity. But their
money is not. Sixty years ago the railroads were local and the
stockholders attended meetings. In New England a free pass
was given for the day of the annual meeting. Now, however,
gigantic corporations with hundreds of millions of capitalization
and tens of thousands of stockholders, scattered far and wide,
hold their annual elections hundreds of miles away from the
stockholders. Personal attendance has become impossible and
so the proxy system has grown up. The Union Pacific with
its $321,835,110 of capital stock holds its annual meeting in
Utah; the Southern Pacific with its $272,677,405, in Kentucky.
Stockholders' meetings have become a legal fiction. The direc-
tors have inherited their positions *or have come in by a self-
perpetuating process, or have taken office by default (the
company being in trouble), or have broken in by a coup. If
federal incorporation means a perpetuation of this system, it
means a continuation of the present conficit. The investor will
still refuse to invest. Railroad facilities will fail and the whole
plan of federal charters will break down.
There is another significant phase of the present system of
control. It may be sectionalism but it is also fact. A year ago,
of the 117 directors of the eight great railroad systems in the
Mississippi Valley, only 23 were identified with that Valley.
Ninety-two were in the east; 2 in California. New York had
58; Pennsylvania 20; Massachusetts 6. And yet these eight
great railroad systems are the warp and woof of the west.
Without them the west would collapse. When it is remembered
that the west has a majority of -Congress and of the voters of
the country, who can wonder, with such directors, that the west
demanded the Interstate Commerce Commission and will soon
demand public control of the railroads? Regulation has failed,
and public control, the American people are determined to have
In fact, the American people have already taken practical control
through commissions and should now take complete control.
This would abolish all commissions, so far as railroads are con-
cerned, because if the directors were named by the government,
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regulation by commissions would be necessary. The directors
would order done that which should be done, after the same
investigation as prevails now. Prompt inquiry and quick deci-
sive action would take the place of semi-judicial, semi-executive,
semi-legislative commissions. Would not -that be better than
multiplication of subcommissions of the Interstate Commerce
Commission as now proposed by the railroads?
But is not this the same as government ownership? And is
it any improvement on the present way of selecting directors?
The best way to answer these questions is to examine the ills to
which we are now subject, apply the remedies, and watch the
result.
For instance, assuming that we will have either federal rail-
road charters or government ownership, will the following
troubles be solved best by (i) government ownership; (2) a
federal railroad board naming the directors of the federal rail-
road corporations, hereinafter called the "Federal Railroad
Board"; or (3) the federal railroad directors elected as they are
now, under the state charters, this system being hereinafter
referred to as the "Autocracy."
Excessive regulation. Some forty-five state commissions would
be put out of business, so far as the railroads are concerned, by
any one of the three plans mentioned above. The Interstate
Commerce Commission on the other hand would be practically
displaced only by government ownership or a Federal Railroad
Board. The Autocracy could not do this.
Discriminations and Rebates. These also would cease under
government ownership or a Federal Railroad Board. They will
not cease under a continuation of the Autocracy.
Wasteful competition. Duplicate passenger trains and freight
trains would be controlled and the wasteful competition would
cease under government ownership or a Federal Railroad Board.
It will not cease under a continuation of the Autocracy. The
saving that could be made in this way is far beyond anything
that the public now realizes, and particularly as to through pas-
senger service between the Atlantic and the Pacific.
Wasteful regulation and litigation. Here, too, government
ownership or a Federal Railroad Board would put an end to this
waste. The saving in expense of commissions alone would be
enormous, to say nothing of the expense of railroad officers,
clerks, employees, etc. A continuation of the Autocracy will
accomplish nothing in this respect.
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The above four elements of the railroad problem would be
equally well taken care of by government ownership and by a
Federal Railroad Boarl. They will not be cured by a con-
tinuation of the present system of electing directors. As to
the remaining elements mentioned below, the result is still more
striking.
Taxes. At present the states derive over $iooooo,ooo annually
from taxation of railroads. Under government ownership this
would cease. Under a Federal Railroad Board or the Autocracy
it would not cease, unless Congress expressly prohibited such
state taxation, and that need not happen.
Money. Government ownership would start with a debt of
from $15,ooo,ooo,ooo to $2o,ooo,oooooo. The amount is stag-
gering. In addition the government would have to furnish
$I,oooooO,ooo a year for several years for present railroad
needs. A Federal Railroad Board would not in itself enable
the railroads to sell enough stock and bonds to raise this $i,ooO,-
ooo,ooo a year, but with complete public control thus taken by
the government, the government would have to take the respon-
sibility of guaranteeing a small dividend on the stocks issued
by the new federal railroad corporations. 29  On the other hand,
federal railroad charters with a mere continuation of the present
system of electing directors will not produce the money.
Railroad men point out that no double track railroad is found
west of the Mississippi excepting one; that since January I, 1915,
only $I2,9io,52o has been raised by the railroads 'by the issue
of stock; that last year saw less new railroad construction than
any year since the 'Civil War;, that while the industrial develop-
ment of the country is phenomenal the railroads are standing
still, and that the American people will insist on new railroad
facilities even if government ownership is necessary to obtain
them. Meantime the waters are stirring and public discussion
is boiling because trade is blocked for lack of cars, locomotives,
and tracks. Coal lies at the mouth of the mines and grain at
29 A proposed Act of Congress for incorporating federal railroad com-
panies with directors to be named by a Federal Railroad Board; prohibi-
tion of State regulation; 3 per cent on the capital stock to be guaranteed
by the government, with a possible extra 3 per cent to the stockholders if
earned; all over 6 per cent to go to the government, was'drawn and
published by the writer in a series of letters written to The Sun (New
York, April, 1gz6).
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way stations, while prices soar. The railroads have not the
money and cannot get it.
Deficit in operation. There certainly would be a deficit in
operation if we adopted government ownership. A Federal
Railroad Board would be safer, because, as shown below, the
mob of office seekers could be more easily kept out. It must
be admitted that a continuation of the Autocracy will be safer
still because the present railroad directors do not allow politicians
to run the railroads.
Poor service; unnecessary service; undesirable extensions;
waste; stagnation. Here too great abuses would arise under
government ownership. They have arisen wherever governments
have owned and operated the railroads except in Germany. A
Federal Railroad Board would be better, and certainly could
not be worse. A continuation of the present autocratic mode of
electing directors will continue the present efficiency, but will
also continue the present unnecessary competitive service and
unnecessary competitive extensions.
Lower rates. Government ownership would give these on
account of political pressure, but it would be at the expense of
a great deficit, which would have to be made up by taxes, and
hence lower rates produced in that way would be merely trans-
ferring money from tax payers to other pockets. A Federal
Railroad Board could and would eliminate duplicate service and
the saving would render possible lower rates. A continuation
of present directors will accomplish nothing in this respect. On
the contrary, present directors are continually clamoring for
higher rates.
Politics. This is the most difficult and dangerous element of
all. The country instinctively feels that government ownership
is incompatible with our republican institutions. It would mean
an office-holding oligarchy, which would dominate the govern-
ment itself, in politics, finance, and policy. The history of gov-
ernment-owned railroads in other countries is well known. Their
failures are disastrous enough to make our country pause, and
no one as yet seriously advocates this ruinous experiment. If
the government owned and operated the railroads they would
be the happy hunting ground of ignorant voters and crooked
politicians. It cannot be claimed, however, that politics neces-
sarily would creep into a Federal Railroad Board. There is no
government ownership of railroads in Great Britain, yet at the
outbreak of the war the British government took over the rail-
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roads in the United Kingdom and has been operating them ever
since by means of an executive committee composed of tne
general managers of the railroads themselves. In return the
government practically guaranteed dividends to the railroad
stockholders at the same-rate as before the war. The govern-
ment takes all the receipts and pays all the expenses. It is
government control without government ownership. Of course
all this has been in time of war, but there is no reason why it
is not equally possible in time of peace. It is a feasible plan to
meet all railroad problems and has the additional advantage that
it prepares in time of peace for national defense in time of war.
It preserves the identity and separate existence of railroad cor-
porations, and thus enables the government to keep politics out
of their management. New York City has aided the railroad
corporations to build its subway system at a cost of hundreds of
millions of dollars. There has been no waste; neither has the
city yielded to the clamorous demands of the suburbanites for
unnecessary extensions. And there is no reason why a Federal
Railroad Board is not as feasible for controlling the railroads
as a Federal Reserve Board has proved to be for controlling the
banks. Such a Federal Railroad Board would aid in keeping
the railroads out of politics. It could be named by the President
and confirmed by the Senate and could be given power to name
the directors of the different federal railroad corporations. A
plan of that sort would separate the railroads from the office
hunters by five distinct and formidable lines of intrenchments.
(I) The President and Senate selecting the Federal Rail-
road Board would endeavor to get good men, free from politics,
as has been done in the case of the Federal Reserve Board.
(2) The Federal Railroad Board itself would naturally seek
for the best men to serve as directors of the federal railroad cor-
porations. It would have no motive for doing otherwise..
(3) The railroad directors so named would feel the respon-
sibility of selecting proper general managers. They would in a
way be government officials.
(4) The general managers so selected would be interested
most of all in having an efficient and non-political staff to operate
their railroads.
(5) The hundreds of thousands of stockholders scattered
throughout the country, desirous of larger dividends than a
guaranteed 3 per cent, or thereabouts, would exert a most whole-
some influence in keeping the railroads out of politics. They
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c9uld even be given a voice by proxy in the selection of the
Federal Railroad Board, and would make their influence felt as
conservative investors. A million stockholders in one unified
railroad system of control would be better than a half million
stockholders in dozens of railroad corporations, as at present.
As a final safeguard against political control, these million stock-
holders might well be given a limited veto power over the
management.
It is true that a continuation of the present mode of selecting
railroad directors will not put the railroads under the control
of politicians, but on the other hand it will continue to subject
the railroads to the attacks of politicians, with the result that
federal railroad corporations cannot be financed and the money
for necessary extensions and improvements cannot be obtained.
Then the whole fabric will collapse and we will move swiftly to
government ownership.
WILLIAM W. COOK.
NEw YoRK BAR.
